

## VERGIL AND THE POLITICS OF WAR\*

The Romans had various ways of justifying their imperial aims and methods, some high-minded, some less so.<sup>1</sup> We find in particular that they could give honourable and satisfying explanations of their aims and methods in war. Here for example is Cicero:

quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pace uiuatur; parta autem uictoria conseruandi ii, qui non crudeles in bello, non immanes fuerunt, ut maiores nostri Tusculanos, Aequos... in ciuitatem etiam acceperunt, at Carthaginem... funditus sustulerunt... mea quidem sententia paci, quae nihil habitura sit insidiarum, semper est consulendum. et cum iis, quos ui deuiceris, consulendum est, tum ii qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamuis murum aries percusserit, recipiendi (*Off.* 1. 35).

Cicero makes basically two points: (1) the aim of Roman war is peace and security; (2) the proper policy towards vanquished peoples is, where possible, magnanimity and mercy. These keynotes are easy to parallel.<sup>2</sup> Here is a passage later in the *De Officiis* (1. 62):

sed ea animi elatio, quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si iustitia uacat pugnatque non pro salute communi, sed pro suis commodis, in uitio est; non modo enim id uirtutis non est, sed est potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis. itaque probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam uirtutem esse dicunt propugnantem pro aequitate.

Note, among other things, *pro salute communi*. Rome's supposed clemency towards her enemies was virtually proverbial – among Romans (Cato *ap.* Gell. 6. 3. 52, Liv. 33. 12. 7, Caes. *B.G.* 2. 14, etc.); Sallust's reference to Rome's traditional magnanimity in victory (*Cat.* 12. 4) also implies that the aim of war was 'peace':

neque uictis quicquam praeter iniuriae licentiam eripiebant [sc. maiores].

Let us turn now to Augustus. Long before he catalogues his imperial victories and gains in the *Res Gestae* (26–33, *omnium prouinciarum populi Romani, quibus finitimae fuerunt gentes quae non parerent imperio nostro, fines auxi...*), he records his policy of imperial mercy towards the defeated (3):

externas gentes, quibus tuto ignosci potuit, conseruare quam excidere malui;

just previously to that he celebrates his slightly more ambiguous policy of mercy towards his defeated enemies in the civil wars:<sup>3</sup>

uictorque omnibus ueniam petentibus ciuibus peperci.

\* Much has of course been written on most of the topics dealt with in this paper, and many articles and books are referred to in the notes. A high proportion of the articles are disappointing; one that is not and which I would single out for special mention is R. D. Williams, 'The purpose of the *Aeneid*', *Antichthon* 1 (1967), 29–41. Messrs P. G. McC. Brown and D. P. Fowler have read and criticized the present paper. My thanks to them. It is not to be assumed they agree with it all.

<sup>1</sup> See the useful paper of P. A. Brunt, 'Laus Imperii', in: P. D. A. Garnsey and C. A. Whittaker (eds.), *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1978).

<sup>2</sup> cf. too Brunt, loc. cit., especially pp. 178 ff. and Norden on *Aen.* 6. 847–53. Be it noted, however, that we find some curious interpretations of what constituted 'mercy', and of what 'peace and security as the aim of war' involved or allowed. This is amply documented by Brunt.

<sup>3</sup> cf. Sen. *Clem.* 2. 3. 1 *clementia est temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi uel lenitas superioris aduersus inferiorem in constituendis poenis*. One can see why an offer of *clementia* might be resented. See the excellent comments of D. C. Earl, *The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome* (London, 1967), p. 60. I return to the question of *clementia* below.

And, again long before that catalogue of imperial victories, he focuses on the peace that is to be attributed to those victories; proudly he records the solemn, ritual celebrations of his peace (13):

Ianum Quirinum, quem clausum esse maiores nostri uoluerunt, cum per totum imperium populi Romani terra marique esset parta uictoriis pax... ter me principe senatus claudendum esse censuit.

Horace, his poet laureate, hymns that same peace and the same ritual in his final Ode (4. 15. 4 ff.): *tua, Caesar, aetas... uacuum duellis | Ianum Quirini clausit*, etc.). And lines 49 ff. of Horace's *Carmen Saeculare* are perhaps particularly notable:

quaeque uos bubus ueneratur albis  
clarus Anchisae Venerisque sanguis,  
impetret, bellante prior, iacentem  
lenis in hostem.  
iam mari terraque manus potentis  
Medus Albanasque timet securis,  
iam Scythae responsa petunt superbi  
nuper et Indi.

Military supremacy, magnanimity to defeated foes, peace and security *because* of military supremacy: Horace lyricizes the achievements of his patron. Horace reminds us of Cicero too, and the others – because Augustus phrased his achievements in traditional, idealizing ways.

The above passages suggest, then, certain ways in which Roman imperialists in idealizing mood liked to present Roman aims and methods in war. The authors in fact (in spite of their idealizing) speak in the main from a political standpoint; indeed, excluding Horace, they are politicians, active or retired.<sup>4</sup> Philosophers offered ways in which the presentation of Roman warfare could be further refined – as *Off.* 1. 62 (and 63) already indicates. It is of particular interest to consider Stoic ideas, because Stoic ethics had so much practical significance in Roman public life<sup>5</sup> – and of course for Vergil.<sup>6</sup> Stoic advocacy of self-denying duty, of subordination, *praebere se fato*, was in tune with traditional Roman and Vergilian ideas and ideals: with *pietas*, with *non sibi sed patriae natus*, and with Vergil's *fatum sequi*.<sup>7</sup> Of course the traditional Roman admiration for personal or familial *gloria* was less easily married with Stoicism; but *gloria* was far from beloved by Vergil – and much less in favour in the New Age of Augustus than formerly.<sup>8</sup>

*Off.* 1. 62 shows us that the Stoics had views on the proper nature of bravery. But on this topic a discussion in Cic. *Tusc.* 4. 43 ff. is more illuminating:

What of the contention of the Peripatetics that these selfsame disorders (*perturbationes*) which we (Stoics) think need extirpating are not only natural but also bestowed on us by nature for a useful end?... In the first place they praise irascibility (*iracundia*, i.e. one of the 'disorders') at great length; they name it the whetstone of bravery (*cotem fortitudinis*) and say that the assaults of angry men upon an enemy or disloyal citizen show greater vehemence (43)... The answer to the Peripatetics is given by the Stoics... 'disorder is an agitation of the soul alien from reason, contrary to nature' (47)... [Examples are then cited where bravery was quite clearly divorced

<sup>4</sup> Cicero speaks (it seems to me) more as a Roman than as a Panaetian in *Off.* 1. 35; though the distinction is perhaps artificial: see below.

<sup>5</sup> See E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (London, 1911), esp. pp. 380 ff.

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. R. Heinze, *Virgils epische Technik*<sup>3</sup> (Leipzig, 1914), index sub 'Stoa', and see below.

<sup>7</sup> Sen. *Dial.* 1. 5. 8, Verg. *Aen.* 2. 701, 3. 114, etc.; Heinze, op. cit. pp. 301 f. For the attitude *non sibi sed patriae natus* (Cic. *Mur.* 83, etc.) see most usefully J. Griffin, *GR* 26 (1979), 73–4.

<sup>8</sup> See D. C. Earl (note 3), pp. 65–79. Cf. and contrast section iii of Brunt's paper (note 1), 'The glory of imperial expansion'.

from anger: e.g.]...I do not think either that the famous soldier who won the surname of Torquatus was angry when he dragged the torque off the Gaul, or that Marcellus at Clastidium was brave for the reason that he was angry (49). Of Africanus indeed, of whom we have better knowledge, because his memory is fresh in our minds, I can even take my oath that he was not in a blaze of irascibility (*non iracundia... inflammatum fuisse*) when on the field of battle he covered M. Allienus Pelignus with his shield and planted his sword in the breast of his enemy... Why then do you bring in anger here? Is it that bravery has no impulses of its own unless it begins to lose its wits (*nisi insanire coepit*)? Again, do you think that Hercules, who was raised to heaven by that selfsame bravery you would have to be irascibility, was angry when he struggled with the boar of Erymanthus...?... See to it that bravery is not the slightest bit frenzied, and that irascibility is wholly part of inconstancy; for there is no bravery that is devoid of reason (*quae rationis est expers*).

(translated by J. E. King, with some changes)

If we combine this passage with the earlier ones, we can gain an idea of how an idealizing imperialist with Stoic sympathies might view the aims and method of war. The proper *method* of war involves dispassionate, rational bravery and employs judicious, rational mercy; the *aim* of military action is seen solely as peace and security.

We may notice now that when Horace provides a rationale of, and an 'image' for, Augustus' military actions (*Odes* 3. 4) he talks of 'regulated force' (by implication Augustus') and 'irrational force' (the other side's); and clearly this notion of a rational force is allied to the Stoic ideal of a dispassionate, rational bravery. The key lines are 65–7:

uis consili expers mole ruit sua:  
uim temperatam di quoque prouehunt  
in maius.<sup>9</sup>

We should remember, too, that in the *Aeneid* Vergil suggests the close association, even identity, of a whole range of apparently distinct violent emotions (rage, passionate love, despair), calling them *furor*, 'madness'; and that of course is in the Stoic manner.<sup>10</sup> Further, he represents all *furor* as the inimical polarity to everything that makes for peace, civilized Empire, and justice; in particular *furor* is the inimical polarity to the cardinal virtue of *pietas*. Note in the first place how Vergil phrases the conclusion to Jupiter's grand prophecy of Empire in Book 1 (lines 291 ff.)

aspera tum positis mitescent saecula bellis:  
cana Fides et Vesta, Remo cum fratre Quirinus  
iura dabunt; dirae ferro et compagibus artis  
claudentur Belli portae; Furor impius intus  
saeua sedens super arma et centum uinctus aenis  
post tergum nodis fremet horridus ore cruento.

Consider too the implications of the prominent simile that concludes the great symbolic storm, the first manifestation of Juno's passion, l. 148–52, esp. 151 f.:<sup>11</sup>

...furor arma ministrat;  
tum, pietate grauem...

<sup>9</sup> There is an interesting comparison to be made between these lines and Cic. *Off.* 1. 50.

<sup>10</sup> c.f. e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 4. 11 ff.: 'This then is Zeno's definition of "passion" (*perturbatio*)... that it is an agitation of the soul turning its back on right reason, contrary to nature... (16)... numerous subdivisions of the same class are brought under the head of each emotion: *ut "aegritudini" inuidentia... aemulatio, obtrectatio, misericordia, angor, luctus, maeror* (etc.)... "*libidini*" *ira, excandescencia, odium, inimicitia, discordia, indigentia, desiderium, et cetera eius modi*... (21) *quae autem libidini subiecta sunt ea sic definiunt ut "ira" sit libido poeniendi eius, qui uideatur laesisse iniuria* (cf. 44 *ira... ulciscendi libido*)...', etc.

<sup>11</sup> The relation between simile and narrative is the reverse of what we expect. We are invited to see the storm as a great symbolic overture: *pietas*, a virtue which involves supreme *subordination* of self to god, duty and the like and is thus Stoic as well as Roman in colour, is the quality which may prevail in all the passionate struggles which follow, struggles on the road to Rome. Cf. Otis (note 20), pp. 229–30; *not* that I would subscribe to all Otis says.

This, and much other evidence,<sup>12</sup> suggests that the imperialism of these two poets is coloured by a Stoic idealism. They appear to be imperialists of the type posited above.

Let us concentrate for a while on the *Aeneid*. It is possible to put the case a little more precisely. I do so charily, unwillingly: the application of labels ('Stoic', or whatever) to a poem as elusive as the *Aeneid* is bound to have a distorting effect. Nevertheless: *pious* Aeneas, who follows with difficulty (sometimes in confusion, sometimes in despair) a duty imposed upon him by fate, who finds that his human passions and feelings are in conflict with that duty and must therefore subordinate them ruthlessly to it, clearly bears a resemblance to an aspiring Stoic in a world of Stoic truths.<sup>13</sup> He is also a hero issuing from Homer. He is a hero with a Stoic role thrust upon him – against his nature. Aeneas has much of the traditional heroic impulse to subordinate himself to nothing and no one: remember, for example, Book 2. 314 *arma amens capio; nec sat rationis in armis* – after Hector's solemn instruction. And it is not just a Stoic role that is thrust upon him. The command of fate is to establish a nation and found an empire. He is a hero with a Stoic and imperial role thrust upon him. In obedience to this role he eventually, belatedly, turns his back on love, passion and Dido – in a very Stoic gesture suppressing that other irrational *perturbatio*, compassion, which to the Stoic is as pernicious a *perturbatio* as, say, anger,<sup>14</sup> 4. 393–6:

at pius Aeneas, quamquam lenire dolentem  
solando cupit et dictis auertere curas,  
multa gemens magnoque animum labefactus amore  
iussa tamen diuum exsequitur classemque reuisit.

In this light, we must have certain clear expectations of Aeneas when he enters upon the war in the second half of the poem. They are quite different from our expectations of a traditional epic hero. Not for him the superb but egotistical ideal of heroic conflict: 'always to excel', in the passionate business of battle; not for him the paramount claim of his own individual glory and honour, or the overriding need to avenge the dishonour of an individual with particular claims on him.<sup>15</sup> His role is Stoic and imperial, Stoically imperial. The end of his war must be peace, the security of all the peoples destined to be his responsibility; he is bound to politic mercy, and his bravery should be cool and rational. These are our expectations; and of course Anchises spells most of it out explicitly to Aeneas himself in his famous summation of the Roman imperial mission, 6. 851 ff.:

tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento  
(hae tibi erunt artes), pacique imponere morem,  
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.

<sup>12</sup> For Horace note e.g. *Odes* 3. 3. 1 ff. *iustum et tenacem*...

<sup>13</sup> cf. C. M. Bowra, 'Aeneas and the Stoic Ideal', *GR* 3 (1933–4), 8 ff.; but with important parts of Bowra's paper I am in disagreement.

<sup>14</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 4. 16 (quoted in note 10), 56 *cur misereare potius quam feras opem...? ...non enim suscipere ipsi aegritudines propter alios debemus, sed alios, si possumus, leuare aegritudine*; Sen. in the *De Clementia* distinguishes *clementia* and *miseriordia* (see Motto's index sub 'pity'); note esp. *Clem.* 2. 6. 4 *miseriordia uicina est miseriae*...

<sup>15</sup> cf. e.g. αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων (*Il.* 6. 208, 11. 783) and Hector's words to Andromache at 6. 441–6 (but note J. Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death* (Oxford, 1980), pp. 95–100, on Homer and glory); note the role of θυμός in heroic fighting (e.g. in the formula ὡς εἰπὼν ὤτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστου, *Il.* 5. 470, etc.), and of χάρμη ('joy of battle', e.g. μνήσαντο δὲ χάρμης, 4. 222, etc.). Achilles' response to the death of Patroclus in, for example, 18. 91–3 (and following), 19. 199–214, and of course in his actions in Books 21 and 22 (and following), shows how the greatest of heroes viewed his obligations to a dead and dishonoured friend.

This may be compared with, for example, Cic. *Off.* 1. 35. But Anchises is even more magnanimous: he has no 'exclusion clause' like Cicero's *qui non crudeles*. . . And we might think that Aeneas should feel more committed to mercy and magnanimity than some generals in some imperial wars, for the Italians are destined, as he knows, to be not a conquered province but part of the unified Roman people: one nation.<sup>16</sup> Another point: we may feel encouraged, perhaps indeed entitled, to believe that Aeneas will uphold Stoically imperial principles in the war in the light of his belated, anguished but finally successful adherence to Stoic imperial principles in other situations in the first half of the poem. Or to put it more specifically and bluntly: it would be curious to precipitate the death of Dido because of principle and duty and then jettison that same principle and duty on an arguably less demanding occasion.

Now Aeneas does on occasion exhibit the attitude we expect of him.<sup>17</sup> Indeed he even surpasses our expectations. Here is his response to a sign that war with the Italians is imminent, 8. 537 ff.:

heu quantae miseris caedes Laurentibus instant!  
 quas poenas mihi, Turne, dabis! quam multa sub undas  
 scuta uirum galeasque et fortia corpora uolues,  
 Thybri pater! poscant acies et foedera rumpant.

*heu . . . miseris* unquestionably suggests *sympathy* with the Italians whom great slaughter awaits – and, indeed, he might well have sympathy for those who are to be his people. This feeling of sympathy is highlighted by a striking echo, by the fact that line 539, *scuta uirum* . . ., virtually repeats his own words in Book 1 (line 101). Now in Book 1 the river in question is Simois, in Book 8 it is the Tiber. In Book 1 Aeneas recalls the devastation at Troy, thinking of Trojan bodies rolled in the river waters; in Book 8 he looks forward to the destruction that is going to ensue in Italy, and thinks primarily of Italian bodies, dead at the hand of victorious Trojans. Now it would have been understandable if Aeneas had rejoiced in his conviction that the Trojans will reverse the situation at Troy. Far from it. He has sympathy for the Italians: *heu quantae miseris*. He grieves (we could say) that history will repeat itself (the Italians are in a way his people) rather than rejoices in an imminent reversal of fortunes. Aeneas sympathizes: but he does not allow his sympathy to degenerate into the compassion that is a disruptive *perturbatio*, fogging reason (see above). Aeneas sees his duty clearly: *poscant acies* . . . They will get what is coming; he will do the killing that is necessary. Still, the hero who can thus sympathize with his foe will surely be able to show mercy at the appropriate moment. He will not be inflamed with a desire to slaughter the objects of his humane sympathy.

Book 11 also shows the magnanimous Aeneas, true to form. Here are his words to an embassy of Italians requesting a truce to bury the dead, 11. 108–19:

quaenam uos tanto fortuna indigna, Latini,  
 implicuit bello, qui nos fugiatis amicos?  
 pacem me exanimis et Martis sorte peremptis  
 oratis? equidem et uiuis concedere uellem.  
 nec ueni, nisi fata locum sedemque dedissent,  
 nec bellum cum gente gero; rex nostra reliquit  
 hospitium et Turni potius se credidit armis.  
 aequius huic Turnum fuerat se opponere morti.

<sup>16</sup> Cicero, it might be noted, did not view the Italian wars in this way (*Off.* 1. 35, quoted above).

<sup>17</sup> As well as the passages cited, cf. the beginning of Book 8, which describes Aeneas' concern at the prospect of war and concludes (line 29) *tristi turbatus pectora bello*: this is a far cry from the *Iliad*.

si bellum finire manu, si pellere Teucros  
 apparat, his mecum decuit concurrere telis:  
 uixet cui uitam deus aut sua dextra dedisset.  
 nunc ite et miseris supponite ciuibus ignem.

Peace is his desire for the *living* Latins. His own role in Italy is imposed upon him by fate. The war, for which he professes no desire or enthusiasm, has occurred only because Latinus and Turnus abandoned the peace that had been agreed, and obstructed his fate-ordained role. He and Turnus (he suggests rationally) should fight it out in a duel – the fairest, most expeditious solution. Again, therefore, we have the Stoic-imperial hero – with that added ingredient, a measured sympathy: *miseris supponite ciuibus ignem*.

Now it cannot be said that Aeneas tells any lies here. But we could forgive the Italian embassy if they felt a little bewildered by these cool, moderate, humane words. In the previous book, as is well known, Aeneas reacted to Turnus' killing of Pallas by bursting into a frenzy of rage (*furor*), callously slaughtering victims who begged for mercy, and taking eight live prisoners with a view to sacrificing them at the funeral of Pallas. It was an orgy of rage, cruelty and destruction recalling, significantly, the fearful actions of Achilles when he engaged in battle in Book 21 of the *Iliad*. Not until the death of Lausus do things start to change (10. 811–32). When he finds himself impelled to kill that young hero, Aeneas is appalled – to be contrasted at last with Turnus, who reacted so callously to the death of the youthful Pallas.

An immediate thought suggests itself. At times, *in practice*, Aeneas seems to have difficulty in preserving his own and Anchises' high-minded principles. It is noticeable that when he displays qualities of mercy and Stoicism in Books 8 and 11 he is not actually occupied in battle. I return to this point.

What we should now establish is the cause of Aeneas' rage in Book 10. Of course, there are probably many contributory factors. Pallas was the son of a *hospes*; he was sent to learn the art of war under Aeneas as well as to assist him as an ally (8. 514–19; but there is no more suggestion than what is contained in *sub te...magistro* that Evander expected Aeneas to protect Pallas); the youthful Pallas in death is on any account pathetically affecting, an *ἄωπος*.<sup>18</sup> But the heart of the matter seems to be the fact that Turnus despoils him, strips him of his baldrick: here seems to be the centre of Turnus' offence. It is accompanied by one of Vergil's most striking interventions in the narrative (10. 495–505):

...et laeue pressit pede talia fatus  
 exanimem rapiens immania pondera baltei  
 impressumque nefas: una sub nocte iugali  
 caesa manus iuuenum foede thalamique cruenti,  
 quae Clonus Eurytides multo caelauerat auro;  
 quo nunc Turnus ouat spolio gaudetque potitus.  
 nescia mens hominum fati sortisque futurae  
 et seruare modum rebus sublata secundis!  
 Turno tempus erit magno cum optauerit emptum  
 intactum Pallanta, et cum spolia ista diemque  
 oderit.

Pallas is then carted off – and Aeneas' rampage is precipitated. *Pallas, Euander, in ipsis omnia sunt oculis...* (515 ff.).

<sup>18</sup> This aspect of Pallas' pathos, that he died 'before his time', is underlined by the myth engraved on his baldrick: so G. B. Conte demonstrates, *I generi e i suoi confini* (Torino, 1980), pp. 96 ff.; his argument is summarized by myself in *JRS* 71 (1981), 222. On Aeneas' motives in Book 10 see too Beare (note 30), pp. 18 ff., Quinn (note 20), p. 226.

All however is not simple. It was Roman no less than Homeric custom to despoil a defeated enemy. The action brought nothing but *laus* to the perpetrator, who might hang such *spolia* proudly in his *atrium*. If indeed a Roman general killed and despoiled an opposing commander, the spoils then became the *spolia opima* consecrated in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius: an honour so signal that in the time of Augustus it had to be jealously guarded. Consider too Pallas: it was his stated intention to despoil Turnus in the event of his victory in their duel (10. 449 f.) – a fact that is sometimes curiously overlooked. All indeed is not simple: but the basic issue can be identified. Spoils were the tangible proof and token of triumph, in Rome as in the *Iliad*. As such they enhanced the fame and honour of the despoiler: κλέος, κῦδος, γέρας, fama, laus, honor – the same ethic essentially persists. But by the same token, of course, to be despoiled was to be dishonoured; and friends or family of the dishonoured might think that that necessitated action.<sup>19</sup>

Thus Aeneas. We could say therefore that his motives and conduct in Book 10 are more than defensible. In rage at the death and, most important, the *dishonouring* of Pallas, his noble youthful ally and pupil, Aeneas seeks some sort of revenge, albeit indiscriminate. High motives, large justification for a noble rage. But it is not the highest motive, nor perhaps a sufficient justification. And can rage be noble? Certainly none of it is what we have been led to expect. On three cardinal counts, involving both ‘aims’ and ‘methods’, Aeneas fails to uphold the principles of ‘Stoic imperialism’: he fights in a frenzy (the word *furor* and cognates is attached to him), not with dispassionate bravery; he fails to extend mercy to those who are patently defeated (*subiectus*). And, most important, for a time at least he loses sight of the final purpose of his war. To avenge the dishonour of Pallas is a high aim, but ‘peace’ is a higher aim, *his* aim, and the former is arguably incompatible with the latter. These issues will concern us in more detail when we discuss Book 12.

Let us here spare a thought for Turnus. He kills Pallas; he is callous in victory, and exultant. But what is his basic *offence* (as I termed it above)? At heart, I suggested, it was the action of despoiling Pallas. Leave aside for the moment the detail that he subsequently chose to *wear* the despoiled baldrick (more on this anon), and leave aside his exultancy: Turnus’ ‘offence’ turns out to be not so very large at all; many commentators mislead us here.<sup>20</sup> Turnus’ conduct, like Aeneas’, is defensible. His basic action accords with Roman no less than Homeric codes of honour. But what brings praise to one brings dishonour to another; in the eyes of his friends or family an offence to be avenged, to be furious about. That is how Aeneas sees the despoiling of Pallas.

<sup>19</sup> On *spolia* see the useful article in *RE*, Zweite Reihe, Sechster Halbband (1929), 1843 ff. I cite a few useful references. For Romans despoiling defeated enemies after individual combat see e.g. Livy 5. 36. 7, Gell. 2. 11. 3. For the display of *spolia* in houses see Livy 23. 23. 6 (where those *qui spolia ex hoste fixa domi haberent* are among specially selected categories designated to fill vacant places in the Senate; the principle of selection was *ita... ut ordo ordini, non homo homini praelatus uideretur*), 38. 43. 10, Cic. *Phil.* 2. 68. For Roman soldiers trying to prevent the despoliation (dishonour) of their dead consul: Livy 22. 6. 4. Homer of course often describes such attempts to prevent despoliation. The dying Sarpedon’s words are worth noting, eloquently appealing to Glaucus not to let the Greeks despoil him (*Il.* 16. 492–501): he clearly thinks Glaucus has a *duty* to him in this respect (σοὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ἔπειτα κατηφείη καὶ δυνείδος | ἔσσομαι... ἐὼ κέ μ’ Ἀχαιοὶ | τεύχεα συλήσωσι...). On the *spolia opima* (and Augustus) see *Cambridge Ancient History* x. 125. Note too Verg. *Aen.* 1. 289 *hunc* (Caesar) *tu olim caelo spoliis Orientis onustum | accipies securus*. (*spolium* in the *Aeneid* repays study: there are 22 examples; Heinze (note 6) offers some brief and largely sensible remarks.)

<sup>20</sup> See e.g. G. Knauer, *Die Aeneis und Homer* (Göttingen, 1964), pp. 301 ff.; B. Otis, *Virgil* (Oxford, 1963), p. 356; K. Quinn, *Virgil’s Aeneid* (London, 1968), pp. 223, 326. Misunderstanding the role of spoils leads to these misinterpretations.

That is why Aeneas acts as he does in Book 10. We understand. But we also understand Turnus. And what we also understand, from another point of view, is that there is something disturbingly inconclusive about this 'morality'. If Pallas had beaten Turnus and, as he promised, despoiled him, Turnus' nearest and dearest might have gone on a rampage of vengeance with nearly as much justification as Aeneas. The 'morality' may be judged yet more harshly: a system of honour like this is relentless and sterile. It may lead to a never-ending cycle of honour and dishonour, vengeance and vengeance in return.

One begins in fact to see why in a heroic world, more particularly in the real Roman world, which maintained heroic ideas of honour, a policy of *clementia* might have a specific *practical* function. Towards prospective provincials or client states, the function of *clementia* is easy to discern.<sup>21</sup> But when equals in status were one's enemies (as in civil war) the function is perhaps subtler but no less practical. If lasting peace is to be made one side must (it could be argued) eventually draw a line, swallow an 'offence'. To parade one's *clementia* might have its offensive aspects (above, p. 188), but it was not as offensive as enforcing subjection, nor did it leave dead and dishonoured relations for relations to avenge. *Clementia* could break the cycle of honour and dishonour; it might be the only route to reconciliation and peace. This topic will engage us again.

Before I proceed, I must attend to Vergil's intervention in the narrative accompanying the despoliation (quoted above). Does not Vergil here explicitly condemn Turnus' action? I think not.<sup>22</sup> He remarks that 'a time will come when Turnus would give anything not to have touched Pallas and will hate the spoils'. Of course Turnus will: his actions here eventually bring about his death. Vergil predicts likely facts; he does not pass explicit moral judgment. More significant is *nescia mens...seruare modum*... 'how ignorant are men's hearts to keep within bounds when uplifted by success'. *seruare modum* does have moral overtones. But what does it apply to? It is uttered in response to the previous sentence, presumably therefore to the main action of the previous sentence; and the main action of the previous sentence should be contained in its main verbs, *ouat gaudetque*. So Vergil passes adverse judgment not on Turnus' triumph and the prosecution of his triumph (taking the spoils), but on his *exultation* in that triumph – his exultation 'when uplifted by success'. He passes judgment not on an act but an attitude, adverting in the spirit of Greek tragic poets to Turnus' attitude of foolish, immoderate, premature elation. Much therefore may be criticized in Turnus – callousness, confidence, arrogance even – but we must be quite clear that he commits no absolute offence against morality, divine or human; nor does Vergil say he does.

Of course Vergil's intervention permits the *inference* (so long as we are quite clear about what Vergil actually *says*) that he is *uneasy* about the ethic of spoils – unlike his contemporaries. We may choose to remember in this connection the fact that was instrumental in the tragic end of Euryalus (9. 373–4, 384) – a suggestive detail. But Vergil has another very obvious reason, besides a desire to express distaste at spoils, for intervening at this moment: simply to mark out the action that will eventually

<sup>21</sup> See Brunt (note 1), p. 184.

<sup>22</sup> cf. K. Quinn, *op. cit.* p. 326 (more non-committal than I am); and there are some very perceptive points – and interesting information – in A. Barchiesi, *Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici* 4 (1980), 45–55; Barchiesi discusses *Aen.* 10. 501–5, but not specifically to make the point I am stressing. Other scholars (e.g. Otis, Williams, Klingner) are curiously silent on this question. Heinze (note 6), p. 209 gets it wrong.



precipitate Turnus' death. Tragic foreshadowing is thereby achieved; and the accompanying tragic irony is enhanced by Turnus' joyful exultation in the action.

Finally, a very significant comparison can be made between Vergil's criticism of Turnus and a passage that must have been in his mind: Zeus' criticism of Hector in *Iliad* 17. 204 f. Zeus sees Hector arrayed in Achilles' armour and is moved to utter thus:

τοῦ δὲ ἑταῖρον ἔπεφνες ἐν ἡέα τε κρατερόν τε,  
τεύχεα δ' οὐ κατὰ κόσμον ἀπὸ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων (205)  
εἶλεν.

This does seem an explicit criticism of an act of despoiling. It is in fact unique in the *Iliad*, out of key with the *Iliad*'s normal ethic – and requires special explanation.<sup>23</sup> But whatever its own explanation it might well have encouraged Vergil to a similar explicit statement, given that his inclinations ran that way. The fact that it does not is indeed remarkable. Vergil's cautious comment is revealed as a deliberate back-peddalling. He is most anxious that Turnus should *not* appear indicted for an absolute or indeed a concrete offence.

We proceed to Book 12. At the beginning of the book, the various obstacles in the way of a duel between Aeneas and Turnus (desired by Aeneas in Book 11) seem to have been cleared away. A truce is established, sanctified by solemn, religious rituals. The two leaders will fight, and the armies abide by the result. A climax along the lines of *Iliad* 22 seems imminent. Actually, the main source at the beginning of the book (where the truce is established and the duel seems set) is the duel between Paris and Menelaus in *Iliad* 3 and 4 – a contamination which we shall mention again later.

What are the mood and motives of Aeneas, now and later in Book 12? These are what I want to follow, in the light of our comments above on 'aims' and 'methods'. As he prepares himself at the beginning of the book, on the eve of the contest, Aeneas seems disinclined to eschew anger; it is as if he sees a Peripatetic role for it (107–8):

nec minus interea maternis saeuius in armis  
Aeneas acuit Martem et se suscitāt ira...

But this is not the passion that merits the term *furor* – in contradistinction to Turnus who, in spite of much sympathetic treatment hereabouts, is described as being in the grip of monstrous, Homeric frenzy,<sup>24</sup> 101–2:

his agitur furiis, totoque ardentis ab ore  
scintillae absistunt, oculis micat acribus ignis...

And Aeneas' mind is on peace, 109:

oblato gaudens componi foedere bellum.

<sup>23</sup> The *scholia* provide their own implausible explanations. Eustathius, ad loc. (backed by S. E. Bassett, 'Hector's Fault in Honor', *TAPA* 54 (1923), 117–27) ingeniously tries to settle the inconsistency with *Il.* 16.791 ff. (where Apollo is responsible for Patroclus' loss of his armour) at the same time as interpret Zeus' comment: τὸ δέ, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον – εἶλεν, ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐκ ἐσκέλευσας ὡς ἔχρην, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Φοίβου τὸν Πάτροκλον ἀφοπλίσαντος, σὺ δῶρον εἶλον αὐτὰ ἢ καὶ ὡς εὖρημα... (and the point is amplified). But clearly one cannot disjoin οὐ from κατὰ κόσμον in the way Eustathius implies; the two books simply are inconsistent. I take it that Zeus' point lies in the excellence of *Achilles*, and in the fact that it was *Achilles*' armour that Hector gained (note σὺ δ' ἄμβροτα τεύχεα δύνεις | ἀνδρὸς ἀριστήος). It would be one thing to strip the defeated Patroclus of Patroclus' arms; it was another to strip him of the divine arms of *Achilles*. This Zeus finds 'inappropriate', 'not quite in order', vel. sim., οὐ κατὰ κόσμον.

<sup>24</sup> cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 19. 365 f. τῷ δέ οἱ ὄσσε | λαμπέσθην ὡς εἰ τε πυρὸς σέλας. I choose the word 'monstrous' advisedly: Turnus reminds us of Cacus.

This is confirmed in his prefatory speech on the actual day of the duel, 176 ff. He solemnly binds the Trojans to accept the consequences if he is defeated; and in the event of his victory, *sin nostrum adnuerit nobis uictoria Martem*, 189–91:

non ego nec Teucris Italos parere iubebo  
nec mihi regna peto: paribus se legibus ambae  
inuictae gentes aeterna in foedera mittant.

That is to say: he intends his victory to be the route to peace, and a peace in which the 'vanquished' will have equal rights with the 'victors'. In other words, Aeneas sees the *aim* of his fighting as peace, and intends to secure it through a policy of magnanimous *clementia*. The Stoic imperialist presents himself – impeccably, but for that small indulgence in *ira*. We remember, however, that he was nearly as impeccable on two previous occasions when he was similarly disengaged from battle.

Various factors including the prompting of Juturna, the Italians' own inclinations, an untimely portent, and the Pandarus-like action of the augur Tolumnius (*Iliad* 4 still underlies this section of text), lead eventually to the breaking of the truce by the Italians. Note that the disguised Juturna's inflammatory speech misrepresents, it seems, Aeneas' intentions, 229–30 and 234–7:

non pudet, o Rutuli, pro cunctis talibus unam  
obiectare animam?...  
ille quidem ad superos, quorum se deuouet aris,  
succedet fama uiuusque per ora feretur;  
nos patria amissa dominis parere superbis  
cogemur, qui nunc lenti consedimus aruis.

Contrast Aeneas' words at 189 ff. (above).

The truce is broken amidst and as a result of an explosion of emotion. Juturna's words 'inflamm' the Italians (238). Tolumnius' action 'inflames' the wounded Arcadian's brothers with 'grief' (277), as a result of which they reach for their weapons – and rush headlong 'blindly' (277–9). Battle is joined: a 'love' of war possesses all. Messapus is described as 'greedy' (*auidus*) for the confounding of the truce. Vergil's Stoic sense that all passionate emotions are allied and all destructive and pernicious is evident here in his choice of vocabulary and imagery.<sup>25</sup> How does Aeneas respond to all this? Impeccably. He identifies the cause (or a cause) – passion – and seeks to stem it, 313 ff.:

quo ruitis? quaeue ista repens discordia surgit?  
o cohibete iras!...

But then ill luck takes a hand. Even as he speaks, an anonymous arrow wounds him, and he has to retire. Whether his attempt to stem the tide might have succeeded if he had been able to remain, we cannot finally say. Certainly it is over and failed now. Aeneas retires, leaving Turnus to indulge his passion (324 ff.) in a savage *aristeia*.

And now Aeneas' attitude starts to change. The galling frustration of his position – incapacitated while the unwanted, impious battle grows ever more fiercely apace (405 ff.) – has its natural effect. We know that Aeneas is susceptible to emotion (see indeed 108), and his emotions now start to be aroused. In his fury he starts to sound distinctly like those very warriors whose passions he has just previously tried to stem: *saeuit* (387), *stabat acerba fremens* (398); and, after he is miraculously healed, *auidus pugnae...oditque moras*. When he returns to the fray it is with motifs and violence that are designed to recall that superb grim hero of the old heroic order, Ajax.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>25</sup> See note 10 above.

<sup>26</sup> With *Aen.* 12. 435 f. cf. Soph. *Ajax* 550–1 (imitated by Accius (fr. 156) in the form *uirtuti sis par, dispar fortunis patris*). I shall cite more evidence for my assertion at another time.

Finally, after Juturna maddeningly keeps Turnus out of his reach and Messapus holds him up and clips his crest, we are given these remarkable lines, 494–9:

tum uero adsurgunt irae, insidiisque subactus,  
diuersos ubi sensit equos currumque referri,  
multa Iouem et laesi testatus foederis aras  
iam tandem inuadit medios et Marte secundo  
terribilis saeuam nullo discrimine caedem  
suscitat, irarumque omnis effundit habenas.

And frightful slaughter ensues, conducted by both Aeneas and Turnus.

*o cohibete iras*: clearly the ideals of Stoic imperialism have been heavily compromised. Aeneas deals out indiscriminate slaughter: this ill coheres with magnanimity and is scarcely the rational *fortitudo* of the sage; *irarumque omnis effundit habenas* is quantitatively if not qualitatively a vast distance even from *se suscitata ira* (108). But two points must be made absolutely clear. First, Vergil has traced with extreme realism how Aeneas has under utmost provocation come to this very comprehensible state of mind. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, though Aeneas has now lost from view the Stoic ideal of *methods*, he has not fundamentally – perhaps truer to say, not permanently – lost all sight of the ideal *aim*. However deplorably Aeneas is prepared now to counter enraged violence with enraged violence, his high-minded view of the final purpose of all this force is not yet lastingly or wholly abandoned. In this respect the situation is still different from the episodes referred to in Book 10 (before the death of Lausus). But the point needs clarifying.

The furious Ajax-like Aeneas returns to war. He has one clearly defined object: *solum densa in caligine Turnum | uestigat lustrans, solum in certamina poscit* (466–7). Why? It must be:<sup>27</sup> to finish the work that was so rudely interrupted, to remove in a duel with Turnus the obstacle to peace. Vergil, who has so carefully catalogued the ‘decline’ (if so we must call it) in Aeneas’ attitude to the *methods* of warfare, has not yet given us any hint that his *aim*, spelled out so specifically in 176 ff., has fundamentally or lastingly changed. In the present lines (494 ff.) Aeneas recalls the treaty in which he committed himself to a policy of peace as the end of fighting, and justifies his present lack of discrimination by the fact that the Italians have broken that treaty and thus thwarted the policy. And we have seen that it took time for him to succumb in this way. It happened only after the final goading provocation of Messapus and because Turnus, whom he still viewed as the key to peace, was kept out of his way.

And the text reassures us that Aeneas’ high-minded aim, peace as the end of war, is not permanently or wholly abandoned. It is sadly modified but just about intact. In 554 ff. Aeneas has returned to the single pursuit of Turnus (*ille ut uestigans diuersa per agmina Turnum | huc atque huc acies circumtulit* . . .), when Venus prompts him to attack the Latin city. He responds to the idea, and speaks thus to his men, 565–73:

ne qua meis esto dictis mora, Iuppiter hac stat,  
neu quis ob inceptum subitum mihi segnior ito.  
urbem hodie, causam belli, regna ipsa Latini,  
ni frenum accipere et uicti parere fatentur,  
eruum et aequa solo fumantia culmina ponam.  
scilicet exspectem libeat dum proelia Turno  
nostra pati rursusque uelit concurrere uictus?  
hoc caput, o ciues, haec belli summa nefandi.  
ferite faces propere foedusque reposcite flammis.

<sup>27</sup> cf. Williams’ commentary on 12. 497.

Fire breeds fire, indiscriminate methods are to be answered by indiscriminate methods. But Aeneas still sees the *aim* of war as peace – of a sort.<sup>28</sup> That imperial ideal is still there. *foedus reposcite flammis*: the aim of attacking the city, he says, is to re-establish the treaty, and the treaty is the route to peace. We must of course lament the methods to which Aeneas is now prepared to have recourse: *flammis*, more particularly *eruam et aequa solo fumantia culmina ponam*, said of a city which contains innocents; and Aeneas' heated portrayal of the 'city' as *causam belli* is of course hardly just. We must lament, too, the way in which he now sees and phrases his necessary victory: *ni frenum accipere et uicti parere fatentur*. Contrast that with his promise of peace in 189; ironically, he seems to vindicate Juturna (above p. 197). But in a bloody, ugly way, Aeneas' aim is intact: *pacique imponere morem; ut sine iniuria in pace uiuatur; foedusque reposcite flammis*. And much has changed since line 189 and the truce, by no means all of it to be laid to Aeneas' charge. On this point he himself is insistent. As in 496, so now, 579–82:

ipse inter primos dextram sub moenia tendit  
Aeneas, magnaue incusat uoce Latinum  
testaturque deos iterum se ad proelia cogi,  
bis iam Italos hostis, haec altera foedera rumpi.

Aeneas sees the attack on the Latin city as an alternative to the duel with Turnus he cannot have (*scilicet expectem* . . . , 570 above). In fact it functions as a tactic to bring Turnus finally into single combat (620 ff., 643 ff., 653 ff., 669 ff.). As soon as that happens Aeneas – significantly, of course – abandons the attack (697 ff.). He has what he wants: the key to peace. The duel is finally to take place. A *de facto* truce is observed. The climax along the lines of *Iliad* 22 is finally to take place.

At this point it is vital for us to have one thing clear. Aeneas and Turnus are indeed embarking on a duel closely recalling and of course based on the climactic duel between Achilles and Hector. But Aeneas does not enter the duel with a motivation and purpose like that of Achilles (desire for vengeance owed to a friend); his *aim* is quite different.<sup>29</sup> Here is the reason (or a reason) why Vergil combined as sources the *Iliad* 3 and 4 duel (Menelaus and Paris) with the *Iliad* 22 duel: it allows him to provide Aeneas with this different initial aim. For Aeneas enters the final duel inspired by rage at the breaking of a treaty, to conclude the original business of that treaty, to establish *pax*: if not the rosy *pax* of 189, *pax* none the less. Turnus perceives the first point (694–5 *me uerius unum | pro uobis foedus luere et decernere ferro*), and Aeneas has recently reaffirmed the second. He attacked the city to force a peace; he attacked the city because he could not corner Turnus. Now he has Turnus.

This question of Aeneas' overriding aim is crucial to bear in mind in the final scene of the poem.<sup>30</sup> When Aeneas wounds Turnus (not mortally), Turnus begs for mercy, 930–8:

ille humilis supplex oculos dextramque precantem  
protendens 'equidem merui nec deprecor' inquit;

<sup>28</sup> J. P. Poe, 'Success and failure in the mission of Aeneas', *TAPA* 96 (1965), 334, gets this wrong.

<sup>29</sup> Quinn (note 20), p. 273 misunderstands this.

<sup>30</sup> This scene has of course been much discussed. Some scholars are anxious to justify Aeneas' conduct in victory (e.g. Bowra (note 13), Otis (note 20), pp. 379–82, Heinze (note 6), pp. 210–11, G. Binder, *Aeneas und Augustus* (Meisenheim, 1971), p. 146); others are more critical (e.g. Quinn (note 20), pp. 272 ff., M. C. J. Putnam, *The Poetry of the Aeneid* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 193 ff. ('It is Aeneas who loses at the end of Book XII. . .')). More cautious is V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils*<sup>3</sup> (Berlin/New York, 1977), pp. 81–4; cf. too R. Beare, 'Invidious success: some thoughts on the end of the *Aeneid*', *Proc. Virg. Soc.* 4 (1964), 18–30; these two, together with Quinn's discussion, are among the most helpful. None gets to the heart of the matter.

'utere sorte tua. miseri te si qua parentis  
tangere cura potest, oro (fuit et tibi talis  
Anchises genitor) Dauni miserere senectae  
et me, seu corpus spoliatum lumine mauis,  
redde meis. uicisti et uictum tendere palmas  
Ausonii uidere; tua est Lauinia coniunx,  
ulterius ne tende odiis.'

Turnus supplicates, he is defeated, he is humiliated. His time as a proud leader of men is finished; he knows it and he knows that everyone else knows it. There is no question about any of this; it is all quite explicit in the text. Note particularly *humilis, supplex*, and his words *uicisti et uictum tendere palmas* | *Ausonii uidere*. Next (938–41):

stetit acer in armis  
Aeneas uoluens oculos dextramque repressit;  
et iam iamque magis cunctantem flectere sermo  
coeperat,...

Turnus begins to persuade Aeneas. Why? Because Aeneas sees that it is appropriate, perhaps more than appropriate, that he should be persuaded. The purpose for which he entered the duel with Turnus is achieved, and nothing – nothing to do with that purpose – can be lost and perhaps much can be won by sparing Turnus. His aim has been 'peace'; to establish peace it is necessary to war down the proud (*pacique imponere morem, debellare superbos*). The proud Turnus has been warred down and is emphatically no longer proud, unequivocally *subiectus*. He is a foe who should qualify for *clementia, parcere subiectis*. Perhaps we should put it more strongly. In wars which involve the honour of equals (like civil wars, or quasi-civil wars) *clementia* was not just woolly humanity. Unless (as I said above) a victor is prepared to extend tactical forgiveness, a sequence of honour, dishonour, vengeance and vengeance in return, may never end. Far from gratuitous largesse, *parcere subiectis* may have as vital a practical role in the business of establishing peace as *debellare superbos*. Aeneas has heard the words of Anchises and can see the course demanded by policy and humanity. And yet he is not in the final count persuaded. Why?

Because a *new* motive and aim succeeds the former aim, the aim of *pacique imponere morem*. He catches sight of the belt of Pallas which Turnus is wearing, the *spolia*, the token of Pallas' defeat and dishonour; and Turnus' chance to persuade him is over, 941 ff.:

...coeperat, infelix umero cum apparuit alto  
balteus et notis fulserunt cingula bullis  
Pallantis pueri, uictum quem uulnere Turnus  
strauerat atque umeris inimicum insigne gerebat.  
ille, oculis postquam saeui monumenta doloris  
exuiasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira  
terribilis: 'tunc hinc spoliis indute meorum  
eripare mihi? Pallas te hoc uulnere, Pallas  
immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit.'  
hoc dicens...

Now, a whole nexus of feelings may be seen working on Aeneas, helping to change his mind.<sup>31</sup> But one factor is basic and essential: the question of honour. An honourable impulse to avenge the dishonour of Pallas succeeds, and overrides, the claims of *pacique imponere morem*. Now, and only now, Aeneas' motives as well as his actions resemble those of Achilles in *Iliad* 22.

<sup>31</sup> Good discussion in Quinn and Beare, *opp. cit.*

Before any hasty judgment is passed on Aeneas, some points need stressing. First, since Aeneas' motive in killing Turnus is basically to avenge Pallas' dishonour, that motive is not immoderately called honourable (to talk of 'primitive vendetta' is misleading). It should also be recalled that Aeneas' own impulse for revenge has the backing of Evander's compelling and touching plea in Book 11, lines 177–80:

quod uitam moror inuisam Pallante perempto  
dextera causa tua est, Turnum gnatoque patrique  
quam debere uides. meritis uacat hic tibi solus  
fortunaque locus.

Evander at any rate feels that Aeneas has a *duty* to him to kill Turnus; cf. the feelings of Sarpedon (see note 19). And (against Turnus) it is also right to remind ourselves that while despoiling a defeated enemy was part of heroic and Roman ethics, the *wearing* of such spoils infringed what seems to have been some kind of rather hazy taboo.<sup>32</sup> So Aeneas has honour and an ἄγραπτον νόμιμον and piety on his side. But his new motive replaces a grander one and (I would say) is in conflict with it (honour and piety conflict with a greater Piety – to destiny and Rome, as often in the *Aeneid*). An impulsive act of revenge, however ethically defensible, is not the best way to lay the foundations of reconciliation and peace. To avenge dishonour is to inflict dishonour; vengeance may provoke vengeance in return (cf. above p. 000). From certain points of view indeed Aeneas' action might be thought rather a mad action. Certainly Aeneas does it in a mad frenzy, *furiis accensus et ira terribilis*, emotions that the ideology of the *Aeneid* condemns.

We have by the end of the poem become used to the fact that Aeneas cannot uphold the ideal *methods* of a Stoic imperial warrior. We have seen Aeneas in the grip of *ira*, even of *furor*, many times, and perhaps it is no great surprise to see him thus now. But to see him lose sight of the *aims* enjoined upon the Stoically imperial warrior at the conclusion of the poem, at this moment of climactic political and historical importance – that surely is more surprising. It is obviously more striking and more significant than his temporary inclement abandonment of those aims in Book 10. Aeneas' aim at the end of the poem is human, even in its own way humane (remember Evander), honourable, heroic. But not only is it not the grand aim, it is (I assert once more) arguably in conflict with that aim. If Aeneas achieves his reconciliation and peace, it will *not* surely be due to this last act: rather, in spite of it.<sup>33</sup> And we do not of course hear anything about peace. Unlike the *Iliad*, the *Aeneid* does not proceed

<sup>32</sup> See S. Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions* (Paris, 1908), iii. 223 ff.; contrast what happens at *Aen.* 8. 562, 11. 5–11, 83–4, 193–6, and see note 19 above.

<sup>33</sup> cf. the very sensible comments of Beare (note 30), p. 26. Beare p. 23 also reminds us of Priam's mercy towards Sinon and Anchises' towards Achaemenides, suggesting that mercy is, or should be, a particularly Trojan characteristic. But (it must be said) anyone who recalled Sinon might have felt justified in regarding mercy in a cynical light... At this point, I must concede that not all Romans would regard the argument in favour of a practical function to *clementia* as cut and dried. Cic. *ad M. Brutum* 6 (Shackleton Bailey). 2 = 1. 2a 2 (my attention was drawn to this letter by D. P. Fowler) is fascinating: *scribis enim acrius prohibenda bella ciuilia esse quam in superatos iracundiam exercendam. uehementer a te, Brute, dissentio; nec clementiae tuae concedo, sed salutaris seueritas uincit inanem speciem clementiae. quod si clementes esse uolumus, numquam deerunt bella ciuilia*. Against this we should recall other Roman and Stoic views: not only the same Cicero's and others cited above, but also Sen. *De ira* 2. 32. 1 ff. *non enim ut in beneficiis honestum est merita meritis repensare, ita iniuria iniuriis...* and *Clem.* 1. 21. 1–2 *si quos pares aliquando habuit, infra se uidet, satis uindicatus est... perdidit enim uitam qui debet, et quisquis ex alto ad inimici pedes abiectus alienam de capite regnoque sententiam exspectauit, in seruatoris sui gloriam uiuit plusque nomini eius confert incolumis, quam si ex oculis ablatu est*.

after its 'Book 22' into eventual hard-won harmony. Book 12 ends in an echoing silence.

A thought is worth taking up (see above p. 192). On one occasion Aeneas belatedly did not allow a human, humane, honourable impulse to override the great *Pietas*: in Carthage. The conclusion of the poem imparts further disturbing complexions to that episode.

Now in spite of all I have said I think it is misleading to talk baldly of 'Aeneas' failure' in the poem. Certainly I do not think that Aeneas *progresses* fundamentally as man or hero:<sup>34</sup> I do not think that the passion-prone Aeneas in Books 1–6 becomes a determined and controlled Aeneas in Books 7–12. On the contrary, we see Aeneas displaying the same vulnerability to passionate emotion in the second half as in the first. The theatre of course is different, and the emotions are superficially different. But (as I have said) in the view of the Stoics and, it seems, of Vergil – and indeed of many people – apparently distinct passionate emotions are closely interrelated, even perhaps identifiable. To the Stoic, passion, despair, fear, anger and hatred are closely allied – and all pernicious; for Vergil they may all be lumped under the condemnatory title of *furor*. Aeneas succumbs at the end as in the beginning. But I should be hesitant about calling it failure.

If Aeneas, the son of a goddess, the hero of the epic, cannot 'succeed', then perhaps no one can. With great realism Vergil shows how an Aeneas who is genuinely in sympathy with Stoic imperial ideas of the appropriate *methods* of warfare cannot, under the relentless pressure of human reality, always uphold them. He shows Aeneas trying to keep in view the high-minded *aims* enjoined by a Stoic imperialism and finding again that sometimes it is simply not humanly feasible. Perhaps that is simply the truth of the matter.

And of course Vergil's Aeneas has great success, as an imperial hero: he reaches Italy, he establishes his people. But he is an honestly depicted imperial hero. Politicians and philosophers may present comforting, self-satisfying descriptions of, or prescriptions for, warfare. Leaders may laud themselves for having adhered to the high principles of such prescriptions. Such a one was Augustus – who also lauded himself for building a temple to Mars the Avenger (*Res Gestae* 21). Poet laureates may then echo the claims of their masters – like Horace, who hymned the *uis temperata* of the *princeps*, his *clementia* and the peace and security that was due to his victories. Horace also hymned Augustus as the avenger of Caesar (*Odes* 1. 2. 41 ff.), and was perhaps less sensitive than Augustus to the fact that there might be a clash between the virtue of vengeance and the virtue of clemency.<sup>35</sup> Vergil was different.

Let us speak bluntly. The notion that force employed on *our* side is rational and dispassionate, on the *other* side frenzied and irrational is of course close to nonsense. War is war and violence is violence, and to distinguish between *our* methods of fighting and *their* methods of fighting is pleasant and comforting but likely to be cant. What of aims? Of course one side's aims may be different from another's – but even here imperial spokesmen often fool themselves or others. Many of Rome's aggressive wars were designed to procure security for herself, but they *were* aggressive and 'peace' was hardly their only motivation or always their motivation – as indeed many Romans were happy enough to admit.<sup>36</sup>

There is therefore a certain amount of glibness in Horace's lyricizing of Augustan

<sup>34</sup> But this of course is the common view: see e.g. Bowra (note 13), Heinze (note 6), pp. 275 ff., Otis (note 20) index *sub* 'Aeneas – development of'.

<sup>35</sup> Note the careful wording of *Res Gestae* 2–3.

<sup>36</sup> See Brunt (note 1), pp. 176 ff. (esp. perhaps p. 176).

imperialism. Earlier I associated the two imperial poets, Horace and Vergil. Now they must be distinguished. For Vergil takes issue on the politics of war.

Vergil has constructed a hero with whom any founder or refounder of Rome must be and would no doubt like to be compared. Vergil's hero understands and espouses the high imperial ideals sung by Horace. But he finds that in practice *uis temperata* is a chimaera (*uis* is indivisible), *inclementia* is often irresistible, and High Motives clash with high motives; nor is it always possible to keep one's eye on the Highest. Vergil's hero demonstrates the truth (we might say) of imperial ideals, what actually happens to them in practice. The hero succeeds in laying the foundations of a new nation and a great empire; we must not obscure the measure of his success. But Vergil does not obscure the reality. The wars that gain empire involve ugly violence, and less than perfect motivations will sometimes direct even the greatest hero.

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